A Tatonement Process for Public Goods

DOI10.2307/2296777zbMath0254.90006OpenAlexW2022544203WikidataQ56534569 ScholiaQ56534569MaRDI QIDQ5668217

D. de la Vallée Poussin, Jacques H. Drèze

Publication date: 1971

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2296777

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (18)

A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation ⋮ Incentives, iterative communication, and organizational control ⋮ Retrading in market games. ⋮ Incentive compatibility without compensation ⋮ Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies ⋮ Peter J. Hammond ⋮ On planning procedures which are locally strategy proof ⋮ Dynamic processes for tax reform theory ⋮ Monotone trajectories of multivalued dynamical systems ⋮ AN ITERATIVE PROCEDURE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION CONTROL UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ⋮ A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations ⋮ Protective behavior in matching models ⋮ Policies over time and Pareto optimality ⋮ Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: An integration of the static and dynamic approaches ⋮ Network mechanisms, informational efficiency, and hierarchies ⋮ Neutrality of planning procedures ⋮ Truthful revelation of preferences for a public good ⋮ Price-quantity duality in planning procedures

This page was built for publication: A Tatonement Process for Public Goods