Truthful revelation of preferences for a public good

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(83)90083-5MaRDI QIDQ1056342zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mikio Nakayama

Publication date 1983

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90083-5

zbMATH Keywords

direct revelation mechanismLindahl equilibriummaximin criterionoutcome functionpreference revelation mechanismpublic goodsolution concepttrue demand function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites work

• A Tatonement Process for Public Goods
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3644750 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementability via protective equilibria
• On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions

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