A Tatonement Process for Public Goods

DOI10.2307/2296777MaRDI QIDQ5668217zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors D. de la Vallée Poussin, Jacques H. Drèze

Publication date 1971

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2296777

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Cited in

(21)

• Neutrality of planning procedures
• Truthful revelation of preferences for a public good
• Price-quantity duality in planning procedures
• Incentives, iterative communication, and organizational control
• Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies
• Dynamic processes for tax reform theory
• Monotone trajectories of multivalued dynamical systems
• A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
• Policies over time and Pareto optimality
• Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: An integration of the static and dynamic approaches
• Network mechanisms, informational efficiency, and hierarchies
• Retrading in market games.
• Protective behavior in matching models
• Peter J. Hammond
• AN ITERATIVE PROCEDURE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION CONTROL UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
• A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation
• On planning procedures which are locally strategy proof
• Accessibility of Pareto optima
• Incentive compatibility without compensation
• Decentralized pure exchange processes on networks
• Incorporating conditional morality into economic decisions

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