Protective behavior in matching models
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Publication:1804637
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80002-8zbMath0834.90003OpenAlexW2094191344MaRDI QIDQ1804637
Salvador Barberá, Bhaskar Dutta
Publication date: 1 April 1996
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80002-8
two-sided matchingmechanismsprotective behaviorcollege-admissions modellexical maximin strategiesShapley-Shubik assignment model
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