Implementability via protective equilibria

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90005-2zbMath0549.90009OpenAlexW2033743142MaRDI QIDQ800203

Bhaskar Dutta, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90005-2

zbMATH Keywords

games generated by social choice functionsnoncooperative strategic equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites Work

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• Voting with Proportional Veto Power
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• On a Difficulty in the Analysis of Strategic Voting
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality