On a Difficulty in the Analysis of Strategic Voting
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Publication:4158734
DOI10.2307/1913904zbMath0379.90009OpenAlexW1993381223MaRDI QIDQ4158734
Publication date: 1978
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913904
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