Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90043-9MaRDI QIDQ1162265zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Prasanta K. Pattanaik, Manimay Sengupta

Publication date 1982

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90043-9

zbMATH Keywords

absence of non-trivial decision rulescorehonest votingNash equilibriumpairwise comparisonsophisticated votingundominated voting strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• Consistent Voting Systems
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3635767 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3637541 (Why is no real title available?)
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On a Difficulty in the Analysis of Strategic Voting
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• Social choice and individual values
• Stability of social choices in infinitely large societies
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance

Cited in

(2)

• On enforcing socially best alternatives of binary group decision rules
• On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures

This page was built for publication: Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1162265)