Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons
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Publication:1162265
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(82)90043-9zbMath0479.90013MaRDI QIDQ1162265
Manimay Sengupta, Prasanta K. Pattanaik
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90043-9
Nash equilibrium; core; pairwise comparison; sophisticated voting; absence of non-trivial decision rules; honest voting; undominated voting strategies
91B14: Social choice
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On enforcing socially best alternatives of binary group decision rules, On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures
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