A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
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Publication:1252144
DOI10.1007/BF00126344zbMath0393.90007OpenAlexW2007822525MaRDI QIDQ1252144
Manimay Sengupta, Bhaskar Dutta
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00126344
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