Stability of social choices in infinitely large societies
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3637541 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3234211 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3247160 (Why is no real title available?)
- Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Measurable cardinals and analytic games
- Model theory
- Social choice and individual values
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
Cited in
(11)- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
- Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras
- Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals
- Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons
- A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
- Stable preference aggregation with infinite population
- The strategy-proof social choice functions
- The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions
- Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
- Type two computability of social choice functions and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in an infinite society
- The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem of social choice theory in an infinite society and LPO (limited principle of omniscience)
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