Stability of social choices in infinitely large societies

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90129-6zbMATH Open0362.90007OpenAlexW2015813727MaRDI QIDQ1240133FDOQ1240133

Authors: Elisha A. Pazner, Eugene Wesley 

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/154.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Decision theory for games (91A35) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Model theory
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Measurable cardinals and analytic games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies

Cited In (11)

• Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings
• Type two computability of social choice functions and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in an infinite society
• The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem of social choice theory in an infinite society and LPO (limited principle of omniscience)
• Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals
• The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions
• A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
• Stable preference aggregation with infinite population
• The strategy-proof social choice functions
• On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
• Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras
• Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons

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