Type two computability of social choice functions and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in an infinite society

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2007.02.130zbMATH Open1193.91051OpenAlexW2049346398MaRDI QIDQ990505FDOQ990505

Yasuhito Tanaka

Publication date: 1 September 2010

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2007.02.130

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnesssocial choice functiondictatorinfinite societythe gibbard-satterthwaite theoremtype two computability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Stability of Aggregation Procedures, Ultrafilters, and Simple Games
• Arrow's theorem and Turing computability
• Stability of social choices in infinitely large societies

Cited In (2)

• The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
• The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem of social choice theory in an infinite society and LPO (limited principle of omniscience)

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