Type two computability of social choice functions and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in an infinite society

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2007.02.130zbMath1193.91051MaRDI QIDQ990505

Yasuhito Tanaka

Publication date: 1 September 2010

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2007.02.130

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofness; social choice function; dictator; infinite society; the gibbard-satterthwaite theorem; type two computability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem of social choice theory in an infinite society and LPO (limited principle of omniscience), The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games

Cites Work

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• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures