The strategy-proof social choice functions

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(79)90014-4zbMath0457.90009OpenAlexW2050680129MaRDI QIDQ1151329

Shin Ishikawa, Kenjiro Nakamura

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(79)90014-4

zbMATH Keywords

social choicesimple gamesNakamura numberrelationshipsaxioms of set theorycoalitionally strategy-proofnessregular gamecoalitional equilibriumdictatorial function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Social choice (91B14)

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Neutral veto correspondences with a continuum of alternatives ⋮ Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium ⋮ Weakly implementable social choice rules ⋮ Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions ⋮ Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons

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