Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(83)90024-1MaRDI QIDQ1171972zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Manimay Sen

Publication date 1983

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(83)90024-1

zbMATH Keywords

dictotorialimplementabilityimplementation of social choice rulespartial implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• Consistent Voting Systems
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• On a Difficulty in the Analysis of Strategic Voting
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• Representations of simple games by social choice functions
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• The Proportional Veto Principle
• The strategy-proof social choice functions
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
• Voting with Proportional Veto Power

Cited in

(2)

• Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium
• Weakly implementable social choice rules

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