Voting with Proportional Veto Power

DOI10.2307/1912535MaRDI QIDQ3929345zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors H. Moulin

Publication date 1982

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1912535

zbMATH Keywords

implementable social choice functionnecessary neutrality conditionsneutral social choice functionstrong equilibriumveto power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited in

(16)

• Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
• Neutral veto correspondences with a continuum of alternatives
• Convexity of integer veto and elimination procedures
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium
• Welfare bounds in the cooperative production problem
• Decomposable effectivity functions
• Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games
• Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
• The effects of communication on the occurrence of the tyranny of the majority under voting by veto
• Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness
• Storable votes
• Balancing the power to appoint officers
• Vetoing: social, logical and mathematical aspects
• Implementability via protective equilibria
• An experimental study of storable votes

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