Balancing the power to appoint officers

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.005zbMath1393.91053OpenAlexW2118937432MaRDI QIDQ523016

Danilo Coelho, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 20 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/696.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

voting rulesstrong Nash equilibriumconstitutional designrule of \(k\) names

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Order-\(k\) rationality ⋮ On the non-emptiness of the one-core and the bargaining set of committee games ⋮ On the advantages and disadvantages of being the first mover under rules of k names ⋮ On guarantees, vetoes, and random dictators ⋮ Salvador Barberà ⋮ Social Choice Theory

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