Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53233 (Why is no real title available?)
- Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
- Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
- Impartial nominations for a prize
- On the rule of \(k\) names
- Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
- Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
- The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
- Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
- Voting with Proportional Veto Power
Cited in
(7)- Social Choice Theory
- On the advantages and disadvantages of being the first mover under rules of \(k\) names
- Order-\(k\) rationality
- Ranking nomination rules on the basis of nominating power distributions
- On the non-emptiness of the one-core and the bargaining set of committee games
- Salvador Barberà
- On guarantees, vetoes, and random dictators
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