Balancing the power to appoint officers
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Publication:523016
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.10.005zbMATH Open1393.91053OpenAlexW2118937432MaRDI QIDQ523016FDOQ523016
Authors: Danilo Coelho, Salvador Barberà 
Publication date: 20 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/696.pdf
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Cites Work
- Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
- The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- On the rule of \(k\) names
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
- Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
- Impartial nominations for a prize
- Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
- Voting with Proportional Veto Power
- Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
- How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
Cited In (7)
- Social Choice Theory
- On the advantages and disadvantages of being the first mover under rules of \(k\) names
- Order-\(k\) rationality
- Ranking nomination rules on the basis of nominating power distributions
- On the non-emptiness of the one-core and the bargaining set of committee games
- Salvador Barberà
- On guarantees, vetoes, and random dictators
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