Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule

DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0048-ZMaRDI QIDQ869240zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthias Messner, Mattias K. Polborn

Publication date 27 February 2007

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0048-z

zbMATH Keywords

CommunicationStrategic voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Microeconomic theory
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

Cited in

(19)

• Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule
• On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games
• On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games
• The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
• Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games
• Examining monotonicity and saliency using level-\(k\) reasoning in a voting game
• The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
• Equilibria of plurality voting: lazy and truth-biased voters
• Iterative voting and acyclic games
• When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games
• Equilibrium and stability conditions of a multiparty political system
• The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
• Plurality voting with truth-biased agents
• Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
• Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
• Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
• Balancing the power to appoint officers

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