Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule

DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0048-ZzbMATH Open1109.91308OpenAlexW2128529247MaRDI QIDQ869240FDOQ869240

Authors: Matthias Messner, Mattias K. Polborn 

Publication date: 27 February 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0048-z

Recommendations

• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
• Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
• Plurality voting with truth-biased agents
• On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games
• New results on equilibria in strategic candidacy

zbMATH Keywords

CommunicationStrategic voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Microeconomic theory
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

Cited In (19)

• Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule
• On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games
• On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games
• The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
• Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games
• Examining monotonicity and saliency using level-\(k\) reasoning in a voting game
• Equilibria of plurality voting: lazy and truth-biased voters
• The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
• Iterative voting and acyclic games
• When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games
• Equilibrium and stability conditions of a multiparty political system
• The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
• Plurality voting with truth-biased agents
• Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
• Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
• Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
• Balancing the power to appoint officers

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