Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals
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Publication:621725
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2010.09.006zbMath1204.91049MaRDI QIDQ621725
Publication date: 28 January 2011
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.09.006
91B14: Social choice
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Cites Work
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