Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2008.02.003MaRDI QIDQ952695zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga, Boniface Mbih, Issofa Moyouwou

Publication date 13 November 2008

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.02.003

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessvoting schemesrestricted beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• Counter-threats and Strategic Manipulation under Voting Schemes
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• On a Difficulty in the Analysis of Strategic Voting
• On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures
• Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
• Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
• Stability in Voting
• Strategic behavior under complete ignorance: approval and Condorcet-type voting rules
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Knowledge Assumption in the Theory of Strategic Voting
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences

Cited in

(5)

• Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences
• Restricted manipulation in iterative voting: convergence and Condorcet efficiency
• Schulze and ranked-pairs voting are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, manipulate, and control
• Restricted manipulation in iterative voting: Condorcet efficiency and Borda score
• Distance restricted manipulation in voting

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