Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.02.003zbMath1149.91029OpenAlexW2028031167MaRDI QIDQ952695

Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga, Boniface Mbih, Issofa Moyouwou

Publication date: 13 November 2008

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.02.003

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessvoting schemesrestricted beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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