Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences
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Publication:433155
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2010.12.012zbMATH Open1242.91056OpenAlexW2142687993MaRDI QIDQ433155FDOQ433155
Authors: Andrew McLennan 
Publication date: 13 July 2012
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/abstract/360.pdf
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Large Poisson games
- Population uncertainty and Poisson games
- Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
Cited In (10)
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
- Strategic stability in Poisson games
- Search versus Decision for Election Manipulation Problems
- Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs
- An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes
- The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences
- Incomplete information, proportional representation and strategic voting
- Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
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