The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1668159
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.028zbMath1396.91140arXiv1510.07424OpenAlexW2223286957WikidataQ61440682 ScholiaQ61440682MaRDI QIDQ1668159
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Warut Suksompong
Publication date: 3 September 2018
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.07424
Related Items (4)
On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness ⋮ Corrigendum to ``The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences ⋮ Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties ⋮ Incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in the random assignment setting with indifferences
Cites Work
- The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences
- Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions
- Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship
- Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
This page was built for publication: The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences
