Strategic stability in Poisson games
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Publication:406374
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.05.005zbMath1309.91009OpenAlexW2235204198MaRDI QIDQ406374
Francesco De Sinopoli, Claudia Meroni, Carlos González Pimienta
Publication date: 8 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2014-09.pdf
Related Items
Dynamic equilibrium with randomly arriving players ⋮ The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games ⋮ On dynamic games with randomly arriving players
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