Strategically stable equilibria in games with infinitely many pure strategies
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Publication:1377458
DOI10.1016/0165-4896(94)00765-ZzbMATH Open0886.90186WikidataQ127976908 ScholiaQ127976908MaRDI QIDQ1377458FDOQ1377458
Publication date: 10 May 1998
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
Cited In (23)
- Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information
- On equilibrium refinements in supermodular games
- Characterization of pure strategy equilibria infinite anonymous games
- Equilibrium in behavior strategies in infinite extensive form games with imperfect information
- Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria
- Strategic stability in Poisson games
- Essential stability in games with endogenous sharing rules
- Inefficient stage Nash is not stable
- On strategic stability in discontinuous games
- Essential equilibria of large generalized games
- The existence of perfect equilibrium in discontinuous games
- Essential equilibria in normal-form games
- INACCESSIBLE CONTINUOUSLY STABLE STRATEGIES
- On the synthesis of strategies in infinite games
- Topological essentiality in infinite games
- Essential stability in games with infinitely many pure strategies
- Admissible Strategies in Infinite Games over Graphs
- A Subgame Property of Stable Equilibria
- A new proof of existence of equilibria in infinite normal form games
- Approximation results for discontinuous games with an application to equilibrium refinement
- Essential stability of \(\alpha \)-core
- ON EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENT FOR DISCONTINUOUS GAMES
- Pure strategy equilibria in a class of systems defense games
Recommendations
- Essential stability in games with infinitely many pure strategies π π
- On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players π π
- On the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players π π
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- On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games π π
- Pure strategy equilibrium in finite weakly unilaterally competitive games π π
- Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finiteβplayer games π π
- Pure strategy equilibria in games with countable actions π π
- Equilibria and approximate equilibria in infinite potential games π π
- Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in nonatomic games with infinite-dimensional action spaces π π
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