Essential stability in games with endogenous sharing rules

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.09.003zbMath1179.91021OpenAlexW1994151123MaRDI QIDQ845602

Jian Yu, Shu-wen Xiang, Long Wang, Yong-Hui Zhou

Publication date: 29 January 2010

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.09.003

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumresidual setessential stabilitygame with endogenous sharing rulesupper hemicontinuous

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items

Hadamard well-posedness of the \(\alpha\)-core, Essential stability of cooperative equilibria for population games

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