Essential stability in games with endogenous sharing rules

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2008.09.003MaRDI QIDQ845602zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jian Yu, Yonghui Zhou, Shuwen Xiang, Long Wang

Publication date 29 January 2010

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.09.003

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumresidual setessential stabilitygame with endogenous sharing rulesupper hemicontinuous

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3906272

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• The Stability of Ky Fan's Points

Cited in

(4)

• Hadamard well-posedness of the \(\alpha\)-core
• Essential stability of cooperative equilibria for population games
• Invariance of the equilibrium set of games with an endogenous sharing rule
• Essential stability of \(\alpha \)-core

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