Essential stability of -core
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Publication:521875
DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0515-5zbMATH Open1398.91032OpenAlexW2133852398MaRDI QIDQ521875FDOQ521875
Authors: Zhe Yang
Publication date: 12 April 2017
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0515-5
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Cites Work
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- A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness
- The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
- Essential stability in games with infinitely many pure strategies
- Strategically stable equilibria in games with infinitely many pure strategies
- A Core Existence Theorem for Games Without Ordered Preferences
Cited In (11)
- Co-stability of radicals and its applications to PI-theory
- Hadamard well-posedness of the \(\alpha\)-core
- Existence and well-posedness of the \(\alpha\)-core for generalized fuzzy games
- STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES OF THE STABLE CORE
- Essential stability of cooperative equilibria for population games
- Existence and stability of the \(\alpha\)-core for fuzzy games
- On the strong hybrid solution of an n-person game
- The generic cone metric continuity of correspondences based on topological games
- The enriched stable core and the relative rigidity of HOD
- The weak hybrid equilibria of an exchange economy with a continuum of agents and externalities
- Essential stability of the alpha cores of finite games with incomplete information
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