On essential sets and essential components of efficient solutions for vector optimization problems
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Publication:819055
DOI10.1016/j.jmaa.2005.06.077zbMath1090.90176OpenAlexW2036138473MaRDI QIDQ819055
Publication date: 22 March 2006
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmaa.2005.06.077
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Generic stability of the solution mapping for set-valued optimization problems, Essential stability in games with endogenous sharing rules, Variational convergence for vector-valued functions and its applications to convex multiobjective optimization, Essential stability in games with infinitely many pure strategies, Essential stability in set optimization, Stability analysis for generalized semi-infinite optimization problems under functional perturbations, On essential stable sets of solutions in set optimization problems, The stability of set of solutions for symmetric vector quasi-equilibrium problems, Stability results for efficient solutions of vector optimization problems, Existence and stability of weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium for generalized multiobjective multi-leader-follower games, Essential stability in unified vector optimization, Generic stability of the weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium with strategy transformational barriers
Cites Work
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