Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in nonatomic games with infinite-dimensional action spaces
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Publication:2256860
DOI10.1007/s00199-013-0795-6zbMath1319.91025OpenAlexW2077733417MaRDI QIDQ2256860
Publication date: 23 February 2015
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0795-6
pure-strategy Nash equilibriumsaturated probability spacenonatomic gameinfinite-dimensional action space
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