Rationalizability in large games
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Publication:2447150
DOI10.1007/s00199-013-0756-0zbMath1291.91033OpenAlexW2036032926MaRDI QIDQ2447150
Publication date: 24 April 2014
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0756-0
large gamesrationalizabilitypoint-rationalizabilityclosed under rational behavior (CURB)societal response
Related Items
Robust perfect equilibrium in large games, Rationalizability in general situations, Conditional exact law of large numbers and asymmetric information economies with aggregate uncertainty, Iterated elimination procedures, Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in nonatomic games with infinite-dimensional action spaces, Conditional expectation of correspondences and economic applications, Differential information in large games with strategic complementarities
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