scientific article; zbMATH DE number 19663
[For the entire collection see Zbl 0734.00037.] From the introduction: ``Results due to Debreu (1967), Datko (1972), Diestel (1977), Hiai-Umegaki (1977), Khan (1982, 1984, 1985), Papageorgiou (1985), Khan-Majumdar (1986), Balder (1988), Yannelis (1988, 1989, 1990), Rustichini (1989), and Castaing (1988) have drastically influenced the present paper which in a way may be considered as a synthesis of the work of the above authors. Reviewer's remark: The Theorem 3.1 was proved by the reviewer in a joint paper with \textit{I. Assani} [C. R. Acad. Sci., Paris, Sér. I 294, 533-536 (1982; Zbl 0489.46028)]. An extension to functionals can be found in reviewer's paper in C. R. Acad. Sci., Paris, Sér. I 307, No. 7, 303-306 (1988; Zbl 0649.46030)]. For the converse of Theorem 3.1 see also the reviewer [Bull. Sci. Math., II. Sér. 112, 305-324 (1988)].
- Debreu's social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents
- The subjective expected utility hypothesis and revealed preference
- Convergence and approximation results for non-cooperative Bayesian games: Learning theorems
- On the continuity of expected utility
- Economies with a continuum of consumers, a continuum of suppliers and an infinite dimensional commodity space
- Economies with a continuum of agents with the commodity-price pairing \((l_ \infty,l_ 1)\)
- On the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
- Existence of equilibrium in Bayesian games with infinitely many players
- Equilibria in large economies with a separable Banach commodity space and non-ordered preferences.
- Incompatibility of usual conditions for equilibrium existence in continuum economies without ordered preferences
- Econimies with a measure space of agents and a separable commodity space
- Core equivalence with differentiated commodities
- Conditional expectation of correspondences and economic applications
- On Core-Walras equivalence in Banach spaces when feasibility is defined by the Pettis integral
- A unifying approach to existence of Nash equilibria
- Pure strategies in games with private information
- On the existence of Cournot-Nash equilibria in continuum games
- Weak sequential convergence in \(L^1(\mu,X)\) and an exact version of Fatou's lemma
- A weak \(\alpha \)-core existence theorem of games with nonordered preferences and a continuum of agents
- Conditional expectation of Banach valued correspondences and economic applications
- Extremal choice equilibrium with applications to large games, stochastic games, \& endogenous institutions
- On Vind's theorem for an economy with atoms and infinitely many commodities
- Large but finite games with asymmetric information
- A general Fatou lemma
- Rationalizability in large games
- Integration in Banach spaces
- Interdependent preferences with a continuum of agents
- On core-Walras equivalence in Banach lattices
- An exact Fatou lemma for Gelfand integrals: a characterization of the Fatou property
- Competitive equilibria of a large exchange economy on the commodity space ℓ∞
- Edgeworth's conjecture and the number of agents and commodities
- Relaxed large economies with infinite-dimensional commodity spaces: the existence of Walrasian equilibria
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3979429 (Why is no real title available?)
- Core and competitive equilibria of a coalitional exchange economy with infinite time horizon
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 859442 (Why is no real title available?)
- Integration of Correspondences on Loeb Spaces
- Markets with many more agents than commodities Aumann's ``hidden assumption
- A social coalitional weak equilibrium existence theorem with a continuum of agents and applications
- The Walrasian objection mechanism and Mas-Colell's bargaining set in economies with many commodities
- The weak hybrid equilibria of an exchange economy with a continuum of agents and externalities
- Equilibria in abstract economies with a continuum of agents with discontinuous and non-ordered preferences
- Blocking efficiency in an economy with asymmetric information
- A unifying pair of Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence results
- Abstract integration of set-valued functions
- The cooperative analysis of oligopoly TU markets with infinitely many firms
- The existence and robustness of solutions for multi-leader-follower Bayesian games
- On the convexity and compactness of the integral of a Banach space valued correspondence
- Saturation and the integration of Banach valued correspondences
- Cournot-Nash equilibria in continuum games with non-ordered preferences
- Theorems on the core of an economy with infinitely many commodities and consumers
- Existence of Nash equilibria in large games
This page was built for publication:
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3979156)
