Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts. Concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substituabilities

DOI10.1007/S00199-010-0556-8zbMATH Open1229.91213OpenAlexW1506314170MaRDI QIDQ540419FDOQ540419

Authors: Roger Guesnerie, Pedro Jara-Moroni 

Publication date: 3 June 2011

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0556-8

Recommendations

• Eductive expectations coordination on deterministic cycles in an economy with heterogeneous agents
• EXPECTATIONS COORDINATION ON A SUNSPOT EQUILIBRIUM: AN EDUCTIVE APPROACH
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1795159
• Rationalizability, strong rationality, and expectational stability
• Sequential coordination, higher-order belief dynamics and the E-stability principle

zbMATH Keywords

rational expectationsstrategic complementaritieseductive stabilityexpectational coordinationstrong rationalityiterative expectational stabilitystrategic substitutabilities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Variational Analysis
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order
• Integrals of set-valued functions
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
• On the structure and diversity of rational beliefs
• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Monetary policy and heterogeneous expectations
• Business cycle amplification with heterogeneous expectations
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• A remark on the measurability of large games
• Coordinating Regime Switches
• A unifying pair of Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence results
• Financial leverage and market volatility with diverse beliefs
• Rationalizability, strong rationality, and expectational stability
• A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
• Coordination on saddle-path solutions: the eductive viewpoint -- linear multivariate models
• COORDINATION ON SADDLE-PATH SOLUTIONS: THE EDUCTIVE VIEWPOINT—LINEAR UNIVARIATE MODELS
• Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
• Determinacy and stability under learning of rational expectations equilibria
• Intertemporal coordination in two-period markets
• Representation of finite action large games
• Diverse beliefs and time variability of risk premia
• Short-run expectational coordination: Fixed versus flexible wages
• Expectational Stability and the Multiple Equilibria Problem in Linear Rational Expectations Models
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Sunspots and Cycles

Cited In (19)

• Eductive expectations coordination on deterministic cycles in an economy with heterogeneous agents
• COORDINATION ON SADDLE-PATH SOLUTIONS: THE EDUCTIVE VIEWPOINT—LINEAR UNIVARIATE MODELS
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Sequential coordination, higher-order belief dynamics and the E-stability principle
• Entry under placement uncertainty
• A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes
• Uncertainty and Endogenous Selection of Economic Equilibria
• Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games
• A qualitative theory of large games with strategic complementarities
• Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
• On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: a complete characterization
• Asymmetric information and rationalizability
• Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players
• Short-run expectational coordination: Fixed versus flexible wages
• Diverse beliefs and time variability of risk premia
• The individualistic foundation of equilibrium distribution
• Decentralizability of efficient allocations with heterogeneous forecasts
• Large games with a bio-social typology
• Rationalizability in large games

This page was built for publication: Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts. Concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substituabilities

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q540419)