Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts. Concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substituabilities
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1795159 (Why is no real title available?)
- A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
- A remark on the measurability of large games
- A unifying pair of Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence results
- Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
- Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy
- Business cycle amplification with heterogeneous expectations
- COORDINATION ON SADDLE-PATH SOLUTIONS: THE EDUCTIVE VIEWPOINT—LINEAR UNIVARIATE MODELS
- Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order
- Coordinating Regime Switches
- Coordination on saddle-path solutions: the eductive viewpoint -- linear multivariate models
- Determinacy and stability under learning of rational expectations equilibria
- Diverse beliefs and time variability of risk premia
- Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
- Expectational Stability and the Multiple Equilibria Problem in Linear Rational Expectations Models
- Financial leverage and market volatility with diverse beliefs
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Integrals of set-valued functions
- Intertemporal coordination in two-period markets
- Monetary policy and heterogeneous expectations
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- On the structure and diversity of rational beliefs
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Rationalizability, strong rationality, and expectational stability
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Representation of finite action large games
- Short-run expectational coordination: Fixed versus flexible wages
- Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
- Sunspots and Cycles
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Variational Analysis
Cited in
(19)- Eductive expectations coordination on deterministic cycles in an economy with heterogeneous agents
- Large games with a bio-social typology
- Rationalizability in large games
- COORDINATION ON SADDLE-PATH SOLUTIONS: THE EDUCTIVE VIEWPOINT—LINEAR UNIVARIATE MODELS
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1795159 (Why is no real title available?)
- Sequential coordination, higher-order belief dynamics and the E-stability principle
- Entry under placement uncertainty
- A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes
- Uncertainty and Endogenous Selection of Economic Equilibria
- Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games
- A qualitative theory of large games with strategic complementarities
- Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
- On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: a complete characterization
- Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players
- Asymmetric information and rationalizability
- Short-run expectational coordination: Fixed versus flexible wages
- Diverse beliefs and time variability of risk premia
- The individualistic foundation of equilibrium distribution
- Decentralizability of efficient allocations with heterogeneous forecasts
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