Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts. Concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substituabilities
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Publication:540419
DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0556-8zbMath1229.91213OpenAlexW1506314170MaRDI QIDQ540419
Roger Guesnerie, Pedro Jara-Moroni
Publication date: 3 June 2011
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0556-8
rational expectationsstrategic complementaritieseductive stabilityexpectational coordinationstrong rationalityiterative expectational stabilitystrategic substitutabilities
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Applications of game theory (91A80) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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