Sequential coordination, higher-order belief dynamics and the E-stability principle
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2014.04.011zbMATH Open1402.91358OpenAlexW3126022310MaRDI QIDQ1994585FDOQ1994585
Authors: Gaetano Gaballo 
Publication date: 1 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://publications.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/working-paper_509_2014.pdf
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coordination gameseductive learninglearning in macroeconomicsrational expectation equilibriarationalizable set
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economic growth models (91B62) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Cites Work
- Rational Expectations Equilibria, Learning, and Model Specification
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizability, strong rationality, and expectational stability
- Expectational Stability and the Multiple Equilibria Problem in Linear Rational Expectations Models
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Theoretical tests of the rational expectations hypothesis in economic dynamical models
- Eductive learning and the rationalizability of oligopoly games
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