Sequential coordination, higher-order belief dynamics and the E-stability principle

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2014.04.011zbMATH Open1402.91358OpenAlexW3126022310MaRDI QIDQ1994585FDOQ1994585

Gaetano Gaballo

Publication date: 1 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://publications.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/working-paper_509_2014.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gameseductive learninglearning in macroeconomicsrational expectation equilibriarationalizable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economic growth models (91B62) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Rational Expectations Equilibria, Learning, and Model Specification
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizability, strong rationality, and expectational stability
• Expectational Stability and the Multiple Equilibria Problem in Linear Rational Expectations Models
• Theoretical tests of the rational expectations hypothesis in economic dynamical models
• Eductive learning and the rationalizability of oligopoly games

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