Rationalizability, strong rationality, and expectational stability

DOI10.1006/GAME.1993.1035zbMath0792.90019OpenAlexW1996133670MaRDI QIDQ1312245

George W. Evans, Roger Guesnerie

Publication date: 31 January 1994

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1035

zbMATH Keywords

rational expectations equilibriaexpectational stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items (13)

Local convergence properties of a cobweb model with rationally heterogeneous expectations ⋮ Stability of tâtonnement processes of short period equilibria with rational expectations ⋮ Intertemporal coordination in two-period markets ⋮ Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players ⋮ Eductive learning and the rationalizability of oligopoly games ⋮ Local coordination and market equilibria. ⋮ Learning with bounded memory in stochastic models ⋮ Adaptive expectations coordination in an economy with heterogeneous agents ⋮ Eductive expectations coordination on deterministic cycles in an economy with heterogeneous agents ⋮ E-stability vis-à-vis determinacy in regime-switching models ⋮ Sequential coordination, higher-order belief dynamics and the E-stability principle ⋮ Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts. Concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substituabilities ⋮ Coordination on saddle-path solutions: the eductive viewpoint -- linear multivariate models

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