Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games
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Publication:2347999
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.02.001zbMath1319.91024MaRDI QIDQ2347999
Publication date: 10 June 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.02.001
Nash equilibrium; saturated probability space; non-atomic games; Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE); Pareto-undominated equilibrium; socially-maximal equilibrium
Related Items
Pareto refinements of pure-strategy equilibria in games with public and private information, Socially-maximal Nash equilibrium distributions in large distributional games, Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal Nash equilibria with coarser traits, Perfect and proper equilibria in large games, On the existence of Pareto undominated mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in normal-form games with infinite actions
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