On the space of players in idealized limit games
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Publication:406390
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.06.009zbMath1309.91034OpenAlexW1986590953MaRDI QIDQ406390
Publication date: 8 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.06.009
large gamespure-strategy Nash equilibriumsaturated probability spacegames with traitsidealized limitweak closed-graph property
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