An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences
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Publication:453207
DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0596-0zbMath1247.91028OpenAlexW2030337753MaRDI QIDQ453207
Publication date: 18 September 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0596-0
Related Items (6)
Rationalizability in general situations ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ On Aumann and Serrano's economic index of risk ⋮ Rationalizability in large games ⋮ Mixed strategies and preference for randomization in games with ambiguity averse agents ⋮ On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules
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