An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences
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Publication:453207
DOI10.1007/S00199-010-0596-0zbMATH Open1247.91028OpenAlexW2030337753MaRDI QIDQ453207FDOQ453207
Publication date: 18 September 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0596-0
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Cites Work
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Cited In (9)
- On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On Aumann and Serrano's economic index of risk
- Rationalizability in general situations
- Set comparisons in a general domain: the indirect utility criterion
- On the indifference relation in Bewley preferences
- Rationalizability and the savage axioms
- Mixed strategies and preference for randomization in games with ambiguity averse agents
- Rationalizability in large games
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