Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.01.002zbMATH Open1400.91147OpenAlexW3124096769MaRDI QIDQ508408FDOQ508408

Authors: Yong-Cai Geng, Sumit K. Garg 

Publication date: 10 February 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.002

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zbMATH Keywords

interdependent preferenceshierarchy of preferenceshigher order preferencesstrategic distinguishability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Utility theory (91B16)

Cites Work

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Cited In (5)

• Gain-loss framing in interdependent choice
• Interpersonal dependency of preferences
• Fixed-point solutions to the regress problem in normative uncertainty
• Shared Preferences and State-Dependent Utilities
• Universal interactive preferences

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