A game with no Bayesian approximate equilibria

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.06.005zbMath1309.91033OpenAlexW1972966535MaRDI QIDQ406386

Ziv Hellman

Publication date: 8 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp615.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationexistence of equilibriaBayesian gamesapproximate equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

Related Items (7)

A Bayesian game without \(\epsilon\)-equilibria ⋮ Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information ⋮ Equilibria Existence in Bayesian Games: Climbing the Countable Borel Equivalence Relation Hierarchy ⋮ Pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games ⋮ Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability ⋮ The context of the game ⋮ On games without approximate equilibria

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The context of the game
• Games of incomplete information, ergodic theory, and the measurability of equilibria
• Discounted Stochastic Games With No Stationary Nash Equilibrium: Two Examples
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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