The context of the game
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Publication:513591
DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0938-ZzbMATH Open1405.91011OpenAlexW2273518840MaRDI QIDQ513591FDOQ513591
Authors: Amanda Friedenberg, Martin Meier 
Publication date: 7 March 2017
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0938-z
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Cites Work
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- Title not available (Why is that?)
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- Weakly α-favourable measure spaces
- Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
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- Topology-free typology of beliefs
- When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs?
- Games of incomplete information, ergodic theory, and the measurability of equilibria
- A game with no Bayesian approximate equilibria
- Forward induction reasoning revisited
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- Bimeasurable functions
Cited In (10)
- A framework for robustness to ambiguity of higher-order beliefs
- A game with no Bayesian approximate equilibria
- Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games
- When do types induce the same belief hierarchy?
- Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms
- Pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games
- On the relationship between hierarchy and type morphisms
- Games in context: equilibrium under ambiguity for belief functions
- Complete conditional type structures
- The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces
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