The context of the game

DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0938-ZzbMATH Open1405.91011OpenAlexW2273518840MaRDI QIDQ513591FDOQ513591

Authors Amanda Friedenberg, Martin Meier

Publication date 7 March 2017

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0938-z

zbMATH Keywords

robustnesscontextBayesian gameshierarchies of beliefsuniversal type structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 964178 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Admissibility in Games
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• Bimeasurable functions
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• Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Forward induction reasoning revisited
• Games of incomplete information, ergodic theory, and the measurability of equilibria
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
• On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• Topology-free typology of beliefs
• Weakly α-favourable measure spaces
• When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs?

Cited in

(10)

• Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games
• A game with no Bayesian approximate equilibria
• Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms
• A framework for robustness to ambiguity of higher-order beliefs
• Pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games
• Games in context: equilibrium under ambiguity for belief functions
• When do types induce the same belief hierarchy?
• On the relationship between hierarchy and type morphisms
• The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces
• Complete conditional type structures

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