The context of the game
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Publication:513591
DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0938-zzbMath1405.91011OpenAlexW2273518840MaRDI QIDQ513591
Amanda Friedenberg, Martin Meier
Publication date: 7 March 2017
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0938-z
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