Equilibrium Points for Games with Infinitely Many Players

DOI10.1112/JLMS/S1-44.1.292zbMATH Open0164.20204OpenAlexW2155304018MaRDI QIDQ5548728FDOQ5548728

Authors: Bezalel Peleg 

Publication date: 1969

Published in: Journal of the London Mathematical Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1112/jlms/s1-44.1.292

zbMATH Keywords

operations research

Cited In (13)

• Projections and functions of Nash equilibria
• The context of the game
• Symmetry and approximate equilibria in games with countably many players
• Approximate equilibria in strongly symmetric games
• A note on discontinuity and approximate equilibria in games with infinitely many players
• Modeling large societies: why countable additivity is necessary
• Equilibria existence in Bayesian games: climbing the countable Borel equivalence relation hierarchy
• On the existence of Nash equilibria in large games
• Perfect information games where each player acts only once
• Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games
• The possibility of impossible stairways: tail events and countable player sets
• On abstract economies with an arbitrary set of players and action sets in locally-convex topological vector spaces
• More on the `anti-folk theorem'

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