Interdependent preference models as a theory of intentions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.009zbMath1371.91018OpenAlexW2342851219MaRDI QIDQ308620

Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Faruk Gul

Publication date: 6 September 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.009

zbMATH Keywords

reciprocityinterdependent preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Individual preferences (91B08) Decision theory for games (91A35)

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