Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers
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Publication:417705
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Cites work
- A theory of reciprocity
- A theory of sequential reciprocity
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
- Dynamic psychological games
- Interdependent preference models as a theory of intentions
- Optimal provision of public goods with altruistic individuals
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives
Cited in
(13)- The timing of discretionary bonuses -- effort, signals, and reciprocity
- Optimal incentives under gift exchange
- Private information of nonpaternalistic altruism: exaggeration and reciprocation of generosity
- Efficiency wages with motivated agents
- Competition for talent when firms' mission matters
- Perceived motives and reciprocity
- Supervise me if you can. Relational feelings, incentive pays and supervisory violations
- Reciprocity in the principal-multiple agent model
- Contract design with socially attentive preferences
- Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment
- Classical and belief-based gift exchange models: theory and evidence
- Delegation in vertical relationships: the role of reciprocity
- Gift exchange and the separation of ownership and control
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