Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers
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Publication:417705
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.10.003zbMATH Open1279.91108OpenAlexW3125168011MaRDI QIDQ417705FDOQ417705
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/10008.pdf
Cites Work
- Dynamic psychological games
- A theory of sequential reciprocity
- A theory of reciprocity
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Interdependent preference models as a theory of intentions
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
- Optimal provision of public goods with altruistic individuals
- Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives
Cited In (8)
- Optimal incentives under gift exchange
- Competition for talent when firms' mission matters
- Perceived motives and reciprocity
- Supervise me if you can. Relational feelings, incentive pays and supervisory violations
- Contract design with socially attentive preferences
- Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment
- Classical and belief-based gift exchange models: theory and evidence
- Delegation in vertical relationships: the role of reciprocity
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