Contract design with socially attentive preferences

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.10.002MaRDI QIDQ2667281zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Simon Koch, Philipp Weinschenk

Publication date 24 November 2021

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/203546

zbMATH Keywords

agency modelincentivessocially attentive preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Recommendations

• Contracting under incomplete information and social preferences: an experimental study
• Optimal incentive contracts with a spiteful principal: single agent
• Incentives for unaware agents
• Other-regarding principal and moral hazard: the single-agent case
• Optimal contracting model in a social environment and trust-related psychological costs

Cites work

• Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers
• Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
• On weighted utilitarianism and an application
• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
• Peer effects and incentives

Cited in

(3)

• Inequity-averse agents' deserved concerns under the linear contract: a social network setting
• Optimal contracting model in a social environment and trust-related psychological costs
• Contracting under incomplete information and social preferences: an experimental study

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