Peer effects and incentives

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.04.005zbMATH Open1347.91089OpenAlexW2344665374MaRDI QIDQ290169FDOQ290169

Authors: Matthias Kräkel 

Publication date: 1 June 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/128615

Recommendations

• Incentive schemes and peer effects on risk behaviour: an experiment
• Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardother-regarding preferencesexternalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
• Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
• Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: the case of risk-neutrality

Cited In (13)

• Matching with peer monitoring
• The incentive effect of a handicap
• Incentive schemes and peer effects on risk behaviour: an experiment
• Peer effects and endogenous social interactions
• A note on peer effects between teams
• Peer effects on the United States Supreme Court
• Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation
• Contract design with socially attentive preferences
• Peer transparency in teams: does it help or hinder incentives?
• Collective Punishments: Incentives and Examinations in Organisations
• The optimal role model
• Strategic interaction and aggregate incentives
• A theory of esteem based peer pressure

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