Peer effects and incentives

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.04.005MaRDI QIDQ290169zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthias Kräkel

Publication date 1 June 2016

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/128615

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardother-regarding preferencesexternalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Incentive schemes and peer effects on risk behaviour: an experiment
• Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns
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• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
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Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
• Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: the case of risk-neutrality
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests

Cited in

(13)

• Contract design with socially attentive preferences
• Peer effects and endogenous social interactions
• The optimal role model
• Matching with peer monitoring
• A note on peer effects between teams
• Collective Punishments: Incentives and Examinations in Organisations
• Incentive schemes and peer effects on risk behaviour: an experiment
• The incentive effect of a handicap
• Strategic interaction and aggregate incentives
• A theory of esteem based peer pressure
• Peer transparency in teams: does it help or hinder incentives?
• Peer effects on the United States Supreme Court
• Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation

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