Peer effects and incentives

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.005zbMath1347.91089OpenAlexW2344665374MaRDI QIDQ290169

Matthias Kräkel

Publication date: 1 June 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/128615

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardexternalitiesother-regarding preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

Contract design with socially attentive preferences

Cites Work

• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
• Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY*
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests

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