Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.05.007MaRDI QIDQ2675431zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yu Awaya, Jihwan Do

Publication date 23 September 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.007

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionequal-pay constraintmoral hazardpeer-review evaluation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Labor markets (91B39) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Recommendations

• Pay equality among heterogeneous agents
• Incentives, Compensation, and Social Welfare
• Moral hazard and subjective evaluation
• Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns
• Peer effects and incentives

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Correlation and relative performance evaluation
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Increasing interdependence of multivariate distributions
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Real Analysis and Probability
• Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
• Some remarks on the supermodular order
• Supermodular stochastic orders and positive dependence of random vectors
• The fair wage-effort hypothesis and unemployment
• The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
• The morale effects of pay inequality

Cited in

(5)

• Incentives for research agents and performance-vested equity-based compensation
• Eliciting performance: deterministic versus proportional prizes
• Pay inequity effects on back-office employees' job performances: the case of a large insurance firm
• Pay equality among heterogeneous agents
• The design of reward structures in career games: a relative deprivation approach

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