Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
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(38)- Production externalities and two-way distortion in principal-multi-agent problems
- Cooperation royalty contract design in research and development alliances: help vs. knowledge-sharing
- Dynamic production teams with strategic behavior
- The organization of expertise in the presence of communication
- Optimal incentives schemes under \textit{Homo moralis} preferences
- Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation
- Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach
- Incentive contracts under product market competition and R\&D spillovers
- Awareness and control decentralization
- Voluntary versus enforced team effort
- The optimality of team contracts
- A yardstick competition approach to a multi-firm regulation problem under asymmetric information
- Strategic shirking: a theoretical analysis of multitasking and specialization
- Peer effects and incentives
- Free-riding and free-labor in combinatorial agency
- Combinatorial agency
- All-or-nothing payments
- Mixed incentive contracts in partnerships
- Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1859308 (Why is no real title available?)
- Multiple tasks and political organization
- Uncertainty-driven cooperation
- Principal-agent models
- Experimentation in organizations
- Moral hazard and subjective evaluation
- Robust Incentives for Teams
- Incentives and the structure of teams
- Vertical relationships with hidden interactions
- Robust performance evaluation of independent agents
- Correlation and relative performance evaluation
- Multi-tasking and inequity aversion in the linear-exponential-normal moral hazard model
- Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods
- The economics of career concerns in teamwork
- Network-based peer monitoring design
- Optimal task assignments
- Joint production in teams
- Task scheduling and moral hazard
- Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives
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