Multi-tasking and inequity aversion in the linear-exponential-normal moral hazard model

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.04.010zbMATH Open1253.91100OpenAlexW3125027518MaRDI QIDQ694953FDOQ694953

Authors: Björn Bartling 

Publication date: 19 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.010

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zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardinequity aversionteam productionmulti-taskingwage comparison

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation

Cited In (4)

• Timing of Effort and Reward: Three-Sided Moral Hazard in a Continuous-Time Model
• Inequity-averse agents' deserved concerns under the linear contract: a social network setting
• Wage floors, imperfect performance measures, and optimal job design
• Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation

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