Other-regarding principal and moral hazard: the single-agent case

DOI10.1111/IJET.12131MaRDI QIDQ4584848zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Swapnendu Banerjee, Mainak Sarkar

Publication date 4 September 2018

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59654/1/MPRA_paper_59654.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

inequity averseoptimal contractother-regarding preferenceself-regarding preferencestatus seeking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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