Other-regarding principal and moral hazard: the single-agent case

DOI10.1111/IJET.12131zbMATH Open1398.91374OpenAlexW2741685715MaRDI QIDQ4584848FDOQ4584848

Authors: Swapnendu Banerjee, Mainak Sarkar 

Publication date: 4 September 2018

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59654/1/MPRA_paper_59654.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

optimal contractother-regarding preferencestatus seekinginequity averseself-regarding preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cited In (8)

• Multi-tasking and inequity aversion in the linear-exponential-normal moral hazard model
• Optimal incentive contracts with a spiteful principal: single agent
• Moral hazard and renegotiation with multiple agents
• Other-regarding preferences in organizational hierarchies
• Contract design with socially attentive preferences
• Optimal incentives schemes under \textit{Homo moralis} preferences
• Work incentives and household insurance: sequential contracting with altruistic individuals and moral hazard
• Venture capital contracting with double-sided moral hazard and fairness concerns

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