scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1405567

zbMATH Open0947.91030MaRDI QIDQ4938546FDOQ4938546

Authors: Ulrich Schmidt 

Publication date: 12 November 2000

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

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zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionmoral hazardutility theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

Cited In (15)

• Other-regarding principal and moral hazard: the single-agent case
• Hedonic Utility, Loss Aversion and Moral Hazard
• A dual approach to agency problems
• When can expected utility handle first-order risk aversion?
• A simple model of cumulative prospect theory
• Risk aversion, moral hazard and the principal's loss.
• A simple impossibility result in behavioral contract theory
• A reformulation of the maxmin expected utility model with application to agency theory
• Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
• Moral hazard in investment and endogenous risk taking
• Early selection and moral hazard
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
• Moral hazard with excess returns
• Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems

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