The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent
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Publication:1651880
DOI10.3390/g9010012zbMath1404.91142OpenAlexW2567056335MaRDI QIDQ1651880
Lionel Thomas, François Maréchal
Publication date: 10 July 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9010012
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Cites Work
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- Risk-aversion, prudence and temperance
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- Ex post participation constraint in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard
- On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment
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