Network-based peer monitoring design

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2025.105969MaRDI QIDQ7013189zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Zhuoran Lu, Yangbo Song

Publication date 13 March 2025

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2025.105969

zbMATH Keywords

incentive designnetworkpeer informationtask assignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites work

• Combinatorial agency
• Contracting with Externalities
• Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
• Economics of leadership and hierarchy
• How to share it out: the value of information in teams
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
• Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form
• Key leaders in social networks
• Matching with peer monitoring
• Optimal Contracts for Teams
• Optimal task assignments
• Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks

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