Matching with peer monitoring
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Publication:1995318
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105172zbMATH Open1458.91114OpenAlexW3118474710MaRDI QIDQ1995318FDOQ1995318
Authors: Pak Hung Au, Bin R. Chen
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105172
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Cites Work
- Multilateral Contracting and the Employment Relationship
- Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Comparative Advantage and the Distributions of Earnings and Abilities
- Optimal task assignments
- Matching through position auctions
- Price discrimination and efficient matching
- Some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames
- The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs
- Matching information
- Competing Teams
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