Multilateral Contracting and the Employment Relationship

DOI10.1162/003355302760193968MaRDI QIDQ4789654zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jonathan Levin

Publication date 2002

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ea3484349f4fd1146de011b1c09057df3794e990

zbMATH Keywords

performancecontractscommitments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Relational contracts in competitive labour markets
• Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
• Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics
• Dynamic labor contracts with temporary layoffs and permanent separations
• Multi-contracting mechanism design

Cited in

(13)

• Repeated interactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness. Experimental evidence
• Job protection versus contracts at-will: trading-off entrenchment and shirking
• Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers
• Matching with peer monitoring
• Informal incentive labour contracts and product market competition
• Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers
• The nature of tournaments
• Productive low morale
• Workers' behavior and labor contract: an evolutionary approach
• An observability paradox in linked enforcement
• Strategic shirking: a theoretical analysis of multitasking and specialization
• Moral hazard and subjective evaluation
• Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations

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